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Does R&D intensity influence leverage?  
Evidence from Indian firm-level data 
 
Saibal GHOSH1 
Abstract 
The paper examines the association between corporate leverage and their investment in 
R&D. Towards this end, it develops certain testable propositions. These propositions are 
tested using a dataset of manufacturing firms in India covering the period 1995-2005. 
The estimates support the fact that firms which make high efforts on R&D investments 
exhibit lower leverage ratios. Additionally, the estimates reveal that the dampening 
effect of R&D-intensity on leverage is the highest for foreign private firms. For state-
owned firms however, R&D activity appears to be positively associated with leverage.  
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I. Introduction 
The technological capacity of an economy is viewed as exerting an 
important influence on a country’s international competitiveness and growth 
prospects. In view of its critical role, technology has received significant 
attention among researchers and policymakers (Cohen, 1995). A part of the 
innovative behavior consists of research and development, R&D, in the firms. 
As the knowledge-based economy has become a paradigm for the new economy 
and as R&D has become a leading factor in national growth, firms have sought 
to enhance their competitiveness through R&D investment.  
Against this background, the analysis provides empirical evidence on the 
R&D efforts and financial structure from a panel of listed Indian companies 
over the period 1995-2005. Specifically, we address three issues: first, how the 
leverage ratio depends on R&D investment and other characteristics of 
innovative firms. Second, we analyze how R&D intensity depends on internal 
capital as well as other firm-specific features. And third, how does the leverage 
ratio vary across different ownership categories of firms? 
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides an 
overview of the relevant literature. The empirical model is delineated in Section 
                                                     
1 The views expressed and the approach pursued in the paper are entirely personal.  
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3, followed by a discussion of the results in the subsequent section. The final 
section concludes. 
 
II. Related literature  
Extant theories of capital structure suggest certain reasons why firms 
with higher R&D intensity might opt for particular sources of finance. According 
to the bankruptcy cost hypothesis, R&D-intensive firms encounter problems in 
offering collateral to eventual debt lenders, and additionally, cannot attend a 
rigid payment scheme of their financial obligations, in view of the volatility of 
their R&D project returns. It is, therefore, not difficult to envisage a low debt 
equity ratio for these firms.  
A common line of thinking of the existing literature is that the use of debt 
instruments is not a useful alternative to finance innovation, especially if the 
innovative firm is young and R&D-specialized. This assertion is based on two 
facts. First, the rigidity imposed by debt contracts via fixed payments that are 
difficult to satisfy for non-diversified firms involved in R&D investments. 
Second, the intangibility and specificity of those assets linked to R&D 
investments, a feature that diminishes their collateral value. 
Another line of thinking, following from the pecking order hypothesis 
suggests that for innovative firms, there is likely to be a greater degree of 
asymmetric information between insiders and outsiders. As a consequence, 
these firms will find it difficult to make equity issues.  
Another strand of the literature concentrates on the interface between 
firm ownership structure and R&D investments. Certain aspects relating to 
ownership structure, among other questions, are analyzed in the works by Love 
et al. (1996), Dixon and Seddighi (1996) and Francis and Smith (1995). More 
recently, using survey data for a sample of about 4000 firm-years of German 
firms for 1992-96, Czarnitzki and Kraft (2004) empirically examine the 
association between insider ownership and innovation, and in fact find a 
negative significant relationship.  
In the Indian context, a growing body of literature has focused on various 
facets of R&D activities. Focusing on R&D efforts and technology imports, 
Kartak (1989) regressed R&D efforts on technology imports with other 
explanatory variables, while others (Kumar, 1990; Kartak, 1991) adopted the 
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converse approach. Subsequent evidence Kartak (1997) contended that there 
existed a two-way relationship between R&D efforts and technology imports, 
since on the one hand, technology imports influenced firms’ in-house R&D 
efforts, while on the other hand, the intensity of technology imports was, in 
itself, influenced by initial R&D efforts. Exploiting this argument, using data on 
48 industries for the period 1981-1990, Aggarwal (2000) found that while 
technology imports were weakly related with past R&D efforts, whereas post-
liberalization, the impact of R&D efforts on technology imports increased 
significantly. More recent work (Kumar and Aggarwal, 2005) offers evidence to 
suggest that over the period of liberalization, increased competition has pushed 
local firms to rationalize their R&D activity and make it more efficient. More 
importantly, the analysis indicates that R&D activities of local firms are 
primarily directed towards imbibing imported technology, whereas foreign firms 
essentially exploit the locational advantages to provide R&D backup service for 
their parent companies. However, none of the studies in the Indian context 
focused explicitly on the interlinkage between R&D efforts and firm leverage or 
for that matter, between R&D and firm ownership and these aspects are central 
to the analysis of the paper.    
  
III. Database and empirical strategy 
III.1 The database 
 The source of the data is the Prowess database, generated and 
maintained by the Centre for Monitoring the Indian Economy (CMIE), a leading 
private think-tank in India. This database is being increasingly employed in the 
literature for firm-level analysis on Indian industry.  
From the entire database, we have chosen all manufacturing companies 
listed on the National Stock Exchange over the period 1995-2005.2 The sample 
therefore includes firms whose main activity is in manufacturing, but excludes 
firms whose main activity is in the service sector, including finance. Screening 
for data consistency the final sample comprises of 665 firms.   
Since the early 1990s, as part of reforms in the equity market, the CCI 
was abolished and corporate houses were provided the freedom to access 
                                                     
2 The National  Stock Exchange,  the  state‐of‐the‐art  exchange  for  listed  companies became  operational  from  end  1994, 
which is why we focus on data from 1995 onwards.  
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capital markets and price their securities, subject to prudential regulations of 
the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), the regulator of capital 
markets, whose functions are similar in scope with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission of the US. In the financial sector, the administered interest rate 
structure of banks was progressively rationalised since the mid-1990s. The 
prescriptions of rates on all term deposits, including conditions of premature 
withdrawal and offering uniform rate, irrespective of the size of deposits, was 
dispensed with. Likewise, lending rates were also deregulated. The removal of 
these restrictions not only meant a greater role of the price mechanism (interest 
rate) in the resource allocation process, but also provided an enabling 
mechanism for corporates to decide their capital structure, and with that, their 
levels of R&D investment.  
Table 1 sets out the definitions and summary statistics of all firm 
characteristics based on the sample of 665 manufacturing entities employed in 
the regression analysis. A common proxy for innovation is the ratio of the firm’s 
R&D expenditure to sales. Therefore, to differentiate firms based on their 
innovative activity, we construct a variable, High which equals 1 if this ratio 
equals to or exceeds the median value for all firms in a given industry and is 
zero, otherwise. In other words, High is a dummy variable which equals one if a 
firm is R&D intensive in the concerned industry. The remaining firms are 
classified as those with low R&D intensity (Low). The descriptive statistics 
shows that, on average, the leverage ratio (LEV) in R&D intensive firms are 
significantly lower than those in traditional sectors, and this difference is 
statistically significant. Likewise, short-term debt, defined as liabilities with a 
maturity of less than one year, is observed to be significantly lower in innovative 
firms. As regards the control variables, the table suggests that R&D intensive 
firms are typically larger in size and younger in age than their less innovative 
counterparts. Consistent with these observations, R&D intensive firms are 
found to have lower asset tangibility.  
We include one measure of non-bank external finance. Accordingly, we 
include a dummy for firms that belong to Indian business groups (Group), 
which comprise 65% of the sample firms. Given their access to cheaper inter-
company loans, these firms might be better-placed to conduct R&D activities. 
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Table 1 : Variable definitions and summary statistics 
Variable  Empirical definition  High=11,2   Low=01  Test  of 
means3,4 
Firm characteristics     
R&D intensity  R&D expenses/Sales  0.011 (0.057)  0.0004 (0.001)  10.588 (0.00) 
LEV  Total borrowings/Asset  0.332 (0.281)  0.413 (0.379)  ‐10.009 (0.00) 
STLEV  Short term borrowing/Asset  0.113 (0.103)  0.138 (0.157)  ‐7.618 (0.00) 
Controls         
Size   Log(total asset)  2.539 (0.618)  2.223 (0.586)  21.353 (0.00) 
Age  Log (number of years since firm incorporation)  1.276 (0.381)  1.339 (0.336)  16.201 (0.00) 
RoA  Operating profit/Asset  0.037 (0.595)  0.024 (0.203)  1.186 (0.23) 
Risk  Three‐year rolling standard deviation of RoA  0.043 (0.451)  0.046 (0.132)  ‐0.325 (0.74) 
Tangible   Plant, property and equipment/total asset  0.545 (0.305)  0.572 (0.337)  3.486 (0.00) 
Profit margin  Operating profit/Sales  0.087 (0.219)  0.059 (0.176)  2.295 (0.00) 
INTFUNDS  Log  (cash  flow),  where  cash  flow  is  the  aggregate  of  net  profit  and 
depreciation in the previous period 
2.107 (0.618)  1.788 (0.602)  20.715 (0.00) 
Growth   Market value of equity (MVE)/(Book value of equity (BVE), where MVE 
equals the closing price of share times the number of shares outstanding 
and BVE equals equity capital plus reserves 
2.301 (3.359)  0.989 (8.422)  4.221 (0.00) 
Ownership dummies         
Group  Dummy=1, if a firm belongs to Indian business group, else zero  0.676 (0.468)  0.610 (0.488)   
State  Dummy=1 if a firm is state‐owned, else zero  0.044 (0.206)  0.017 (0.127)   
Indian private  Dummy=1, if  a firm is Indian private, else zero  0.191 (0.393)  0.314 (0.464)   
Foreign  Dummy=1, if a firm is foreign‐owned, else zero  0.082 (0.274)  0.047 (0.212)   
Joint  Dummy=1, if a firm is jointly (state and Indian private) owned, else zero  0.006 (0.079)  0.012 (0.107)   
1 Means and (standard deviation); 2 High is a dummy variable which equals 1 if a firm is in the R&D intensive sector 
3 p‐Values in parentheses; 4 We test the differences of means for non‐dummy variables. Dummy variables do not satisfy 
the normality hypothesis to conduct a test of mean differences 
 
The final set of variables focus on dummies that classify firm ownership. 
Accordingly, we distinguish between state-owned, foreign, Indian domestic 
private and joint corporates. Foreign firms may have access to cheaper 
financing via the parent firm and state-owned firms may secure financing by 
virtue of their implicit government guarantee. In the sample, 3% of the firms are 
state-owned, 7% are foreign, about 1% are jointly-owned; the remaining 25% 
are domestic private entities.    
 
III.2 Empirical Strategy 
For the empirical model, we employ a Tobit model with the R&D intensity 
as the dependent variable. This takes into account the fact that many 
companies report zero values of R&D expenditure. The second model we 
estimate is a Tobit model restricted to firms with positive R&D. This separation 
allows for greater flexibility. In particular, certain explanatory variables can 
have different effects between the two equations and hence, the process which 
results in investing in R&D is assumed not to be the same as that which 
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determines the amount of the investment (R&D intensity). Accordingly, we 
estimate the following reduced-form specification for firm i at time t as given by 
(1): 
tiittttiti IDODControlsDR ,,10, ][& νηλδδ ++++++=                                         (1) 
where Controls is the set of control variables, including firm size, profit 
margin, internal funds, age of the firm and leverage. Following from our earlier 
discussion, since R&D is expected to differ across firm ownership categories, we 
include dummies (OD) classifying firm ownership. Industry dummies (ID, not 
reported) are included to control for industry-specific features not explicitly 
factored into the analysis. λt is a time-specific effect, ηi is the firm-specific effect 
and νi,t is a random error term, νi,t ~ N(0, σ2).  
Firm size has generally been posited as a determinant of innovative 
activity. Nelson and Winter (1982) have justified a positive effect of firm size 
because larger firms are better able to appropriate returns from their innovative 
activity. We include, in addition to size, its squared term to account for possible 
non-linearities.  Higher the profit margins, greater the availability of funds to 
the firm for undertaking R&D and hence, higher the resources allocated to 
R&D. The age of the firm, measured as the number of years since its 
incorporation, captures firm experience and knowledge accumulation and 
proxies for efficiency differences (Erikson and Pakes, 1995). Finally, the internal 
funds in the period before to that of implementing the R&D effort is included to 
control for the deep pocket policy. 
None of the studies in the Indian context have examined the effect of firm 
leverage on its R&D activity. The literature suggests that capital structure has 
an influence on the R&D activity of firms (Bah and Dumontier, 2001; Aghion et 
al., 2004). On the one hand, since R&D intensive firms encounter problems in 
offering collateral to eventual debt lenders, their leverage ratios are likely to be 
lower. On the other hand, innovative firms could encounter greater difficulties 
in making equity issues in view of the high degree of informational asymmetry 
between insiders and outsiders. Combining this argument with the fact that 
innovative firms have greater likelihood of generating investment opportunities 
suggests that their dependence on external finance would be higher. Therefore, 
innovative firms could be more reliant on debt finance. 
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The aforesaid argument points to a possible endogeneity between 
leverage and R&D. To address this concern, we apply a two-stage process. In 
the first stage, we regress leverage on the exogenous variables. This way, we 
obtain a value of leverage purged of its endogenous elements. To complete the 
two-stage process, we regress (1) after replacing leverage by its estimated value. 
Accordingly, in the first stage, we estimate the following equations for 
leverage (and likewise, using short-term leverage as the dependent variable) as 
given by (2): 
tiitttti
tititititi
IDYDODRisk
RoAgrowthgibleSizeLEV
,,5
,4,3,2,1, tan
νηδ
δδδδ
+++++
++++=
                      (2) 
Specification (2) includes the following as explanatory variables: firm size 
(Size), asset tangibility (tangible), growth opportunities (growth), profitability 
(RoA) and risk (risk). In their seminal paper, Harris and Raviv (1991) had 
observed that leverage increases with firm size, growth opportunities and 
tangibility and decreases with profitability and risk. This would suggest that 
expect δ1, δ2, δ3>0, δ4 and δ5 <0.  
 
IV. Results and discussion 
The first part of the analysis corresponds to the estimation of the 
auxiliary equation of leverage. The main message gleaned from table 2 can be 
summarised as follows. First, bigger firms exhibit high leverage, consistent with 
cross-country (Bah and Dumontier, 2001) and country-specific studies (Aghion 
et al., 2004). Second, firms with high growth opportunities exhibit lower 
leverage. This is supportive of the trade-off model which predicts that firms with 
greater investment have lower leverage because they have stronger incentives to 
avoid underinvestment. Profitability is negatively correlated with leverage, 
consistent with the notion that higher earnings should result in less leverage. 
Higher Risk is found to lower leverage. Finally, tangibility exhibits a positive 
relationship with leverage: firms with relatively few tangible assets tend to be 
more opaque and therefore, experience greater informational asymmetry 
problems. Costs of financial distress are higher in such firms; accordingly, R&D 
activity in such firms tends to be lower.  
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Table 2 : Determinants of firm leverage 
Constant -0.340 (0.0 24)*** 
R&D -0.393 (0.002)*** 
R&D*Dummy Mature  
Controls  
Size 0.819 (0.005)*** 
Growth -0.007 (0.003)** 
Tangible 0.012 (0.003)*** 
RoA -0.053 (0.009)*** 
Risk -0.001 (0.0005)*** 
Ownership dummies  
Group 0.531 (0.010)*** 
State 0.485 (0.011)*** 
Indian private -0.122 (0.009)*** 
Foreign  0.664 (0.011)*** 
Year dummies Included 
Industry dummies Included 
No. of firms, Observations 665, 5051 
Time period 1995-2005 
R-squared 0.981 
Wald χ2 (p-Value) 0.00 
Standard errors (adjusted for clustering by firm) are within parentheses 
*, ** and *** indicates statistical significance at 1, 5 and 10%, respectively 
 
Coming to firm ownership, across all specifications, the coefficients on 
the foreign-owned and state dummies are positive and consistently significant, 
suggesting that these firm categories exhibit higher leverage. The coefficient on 
the variable group has an observed negative sign and is statistically significant 
at 0.01 level.  
 
Table 3 : Determinants of R&D intensity 
Dependent variable R&D≥0 R&D>0 
 (1) (2) 
Size 0.019 (0.006)*** -0.010 (0.005)** 
Size squared -0.006 (0.002)*** 0.001 (0.0007) 
Age -0.012 (0.005)*** 0.0002 (0.006) 
Age squared 0.007 (0.003)*** 0.0002 (0.004) 
Lag (Internal funds) 0.013 (0.005)*** 0.019 (0.007)*** 
Profit margin 0.002 (0.001)* 0.014 (0.007)** 
LEV -0.024 (0.010)*** -0.027 (0.009)*** 
Ownership dummies   
Group 0.021 (0.009)*** 0.001 (0.004) 
State 0.011 (0.008) 0.016 (0.009) 
Indian private -0.004 (0.009) -0.007 (0.005) 
Foreign  0.022 (0.008)*** -0.007 (0.003)** 
Year dummies Included Included 
Industry dummies Included Included  
No. of firms, Observations 665, 6272 437, 3120 
Time period 1995-2005 1995-2005 
McFadden R-squared 0.202 0.197 
Wald χ2 (p-Value) 545.36 (0.00) 339.45 (0.00) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*, ** and *** indicates statistical significance at  1, 5 and 10%, respectively 
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In Table 3, the coefficient on Size is positive and significant in (1), but 
negative in (2). Both these coefficients are statistically significant at 0.05 level or 
higher. In other words, large companies have a higher probability of pursuing 
R&D, but with lower intensity. This is consistent with evidence that reports a 
positive effect of firm size on R&D intensity (Bah and Dumontier, 2001; Aghion 
et al., 2004). More specifically, increases in firm size are likely to be associated 
with increase in R&D up to a threshold. Beyond this threshold, R&D declines 
with size. This concave quadratic relationship suggests that the marginal gains 
to R&D are initially bigger for large firms; subsequently, the cost of additional 
unit of R&D outweighs the benefits, leading to a scaling down of R&D expenses. 
Besides the statistical significance, the effect is also economically important. In 
particular, the magnitude on Size in (1) suggests that R&D on average, 
increases by 0.2% when Size rises by 10%. The coefficient on Age is negative in 
both specifications, while that on Age squared is positive, indicating that the 
intensity of undertaking R&D initially declines for older firms, but subsequently 
rises as firms realize the need to improve their products and processes in the 
face of competition, supportive of the evidence for India (Goldar and 
Renganathan, 1988). Profit margin bears a positive sign, conforming a priori 
expectations, although it is on the borderline of significance. The evidence is 
also in accordance with the deep pocket policy: lag INTFUNDS is found to exert a 
positive impact on the firm’s R&D efforts.    
Central to the analysis is the sign and significance of the coefficient on 
leverage. The coefficient is found to be consistently negative and significant 
across both (1) and (2). This is consistent with evidence which views debt 
financing as inappropriate for funding R&D investments, given that servicing a 
debt typically require a stable stream of cash flows which can be deviated from 
in case of innovative projects. In terms of magnitudes, a 10% rise in leverage 
lowers R&D by roughly 0.2 percentage points. In case STLEV (instead of LEV) is 
the dependent variable, the magnitude is slightly lower, but it retains its 
negative sign. This suggests that banks are not typically risk-averse in 
extending loans to innovative projects. What is however clear, is that debt holds 
a strategic disadvantage in the innovation market.  
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V. Concluding observations 
A growing body of research in the Indian context over the last few years 
has explored the technological capabilities of firms. Limited research has, 
however, been forthcoming as to how the R&D intensity of firms' influences 
their capital structure or for that matter, whether this behaviour differs across 
firm ownership.  
Using data on an extended sample of manufacturing firms, the evidence 
presented in the paper suggests that the behaviour of innovative firms, as 
captured by their R&D intensity, differs from those of less innovative ones. More 
specifically, firms that use more debt exhibit significantly lower R&D intensity. 
Exceptions to the fact are state-owned firms by virtue of their access to 
subsidized government loans. In addition, the findings indicate that the amount 
of firm’s internal funds (implementation of a deep pocket policy) positively 
influences its R&D investment. Additionally, the dampening effect of leverage on 
R&D expenses is the highest for foreign firms.  
The economic reforms initiated in 1992, seems to have provided an 
impetus to corporates to improve their R&D activity. Notwithstanding this 
salutary development, R&D intensities of Indian companies are quite low 
compared to global standards. This suggests the need for the policy framework 
to encourage R&D activity geared towards building up of in-house capabilities 
for product and process innovations for competing in an increasingly 
knowledge-based world economy. Keeping these considerations on board, a 
Science and Technology Policy has been announced by the Government to 
strengthen India’s R&D by raising its share in GNP to at least 2 percent over the 
medium-term (Government of India, 2003). These supply side measures would 
need to be buttressed with appropriate demand-side policies by adopting well-
formulated competition policy and intellectual property protection measures. 
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